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ABSTRACT
American agriculture is inexorably concentrating into the hands of
a small number of large conglomerates. Expanding farms pursuing
scale economies would normally have to abide by a system of
environmental and other laws that would, in theory, require farms to
account for negative externalities. If those laws were observed and
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enforced, they would help strike a balance between the greater
profitability and the larger externalities of scaling up. But these laws
are not widely observed nor rigorously enforced, which upsets this
balance and gives large-scale farms a cost advantage while insulating
them from corresponding responsibilities.
Perhaps nowhere in agriculture is this tension more visible than in
the hog industry, which has dramatically transformed itself from one
based on small-scale, localized production to one based on largescale, far-flung production. Ninety-six percent of all hogs raised in the
United States are now raised on farms of one thousand or more hogs.
Thus far, however, the American legal and regulatory systems have
not appropriately managed this staggering growth. Lax enforcement
of environmental laws against large hog farms has allowed them to
grow and realize scale economies without accounting for their
exponential increase in water and air pollution. The same can be said
for state right-to-farm laws, which insulate many large hog farms
from nuisance lawsuits. Further, reckless practices in concentrated
animal feeding operations contribute to the development of dangerous
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and heighten the risk of a transfer of
zoonotic diseases to humans—potentially helping to set the stage for
the next pandemic. Finally, the risks of this lax legal structure are not
only related to environmental and health concerns. The concentration
of hog farming imposes economic costs by reducing competition and
variety, all in the pursuit of lower consumer prices that may or may
not be actually achieved in the long run. Large agricultural
conglomerates should be held to account for these enormous costs,
not only because these costs outweigh the productivity benefits, but
also because they serve to marginalize small farmers and
fundamentally change the nature of farming.
INTRODUCTION

A

merican agriculture is changing at an astonishing pace. While
agricultural production historically took place on a vast,
sprawling potpourri of independent farms, the engine of modern
production is a consolidated network of efficient, cost-conscious, and
interrelated operations. No longer predominantly small and familyrun, farms are now more typically managed by large and sophisticated
business organizations with many key decisions made at corporate
headquarters, far removed from the farm itself. American agriculture
has taken on qualities that are considerably more industrial than its
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less mechanized past. As part of this process, agricultural production
has also become concentrated in large and sophisticated business
organizations. In terms of production, the iconic small, independent
family farm has become a mere souvenir of American history.
What accounts for this increasing industrialization and
concentration of agricultural production? Certainly part of it is the
natural economic evolution of an industry, as it realizes efficiencies
1
and economies of scale. And at least part of the trend can be
attributed to continuing American agricultural policy centering upon
2
subsidies. Not only are agricultural subsidies allocatively inefficient,
but they have contributed to the historic concentration of the
agricultural sector as small-scale farms are replaced by larger, scale3
intensive farms. It is not merely that subsidy payments are
1 CAROLYN DIMITRI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., THE 20TH
CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 6 (2005),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/259572/eib3_1_.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Inefficient Redistribution, 95 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 649, 649 (2001) (“In all these cases, it is difficult to argue that the
particular form of the policy is correcting a market failure. Rather, it seems aimed simply
at redistributing income. For instance, no scholars appear to argue that price supports for
farmers, which have the effect of increasing farm output, promote efficiency because
without them there would be too few resources in agriculture. . . . Instead, it is widely
agreed that price supports are simply a way to raise farmers’ incomes. If this is correct,
then they are Pareto inefficient in the sense that farm incomes could be maintained, and
everyone else made better off, by a form of redistribution that did not involve resource
misallocation. A simple transfer to raise the income of the farmers by as much as the
inefficient policy yields would constitute an actual Pareto improvement.”); Wilfrid Legg,
Presidential Address Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement and Use in Policy Evaluation,
54 J. AGRIC. ECON. 175, 177 (2003) (“The result was a major OECD study, National
Policies and Agricultural Trade, published in 1987, which led to Ministers agreeing in that
same year to a set of actions and principles for the reform of agricultural policies.
Countries agreed to progressively reduce agricultural subsidies and allow for a greater
influence of market signals in guiding production decisions, while recognising [sic] that
countries might also need to take non-economic objectives into account. Forging
consensus among countries on the sensitive issue of agricultural policy reform in an
international context is a painstaking process. The agreement to cut subsidies, coupled
with the powerful signal to increase the ‘market orientation’ of agriculture was qualified
by the potential catch-all of the option to take ‘non-economic objectives’ into
account.”(footnote omitted)); Gordon C. Rausser, Predatory Versus Productive
Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1992)
(“[M]uch of this [agricultural] legislation became a vehicle for codifying rent-seeking
behavior. Examples of such agricultural policy evolution briefly described here include
western resource and water development, soil conservation, environmental pesticide
policy, and farm credit.”).
3 See, e.g., LAURENT PIET ET AL., HOW DO AGRICULTURAL POLICIES INFLUENCE
FARMLAND CONCENTRATION? THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE 2–3 (2010), https://www
researchgate net/publication/46471353_How_do_agricultural_policies_influence_farm
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concentrating in fewer hands as the logical result of there being fewer
hands to receive them. Rather, agricultural subsidies themselves are
actively precipitating the rise of mega-farms at the expense of small
4
farms. A U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) economic study
found that between 1987 and 2002, one-third to one-half of all farm
5
concentration could be attributed to government subsidies. That is to
say, without government subsidies, farm concentration would still be
occurring, but more slowly.
If agricultural subsidies account for one-third to one-half of
concentration, what accounts for the rest? Missing from this economic
discussion is the role of law in creating an increasingly concentrated
agricultural sector. Generous and inefficient federal subsidies are only
a part of the policy machinery that grinds small farms down to
novelty status and paves the way for large agricultural conglomerates
to take up the lost productive capacity. Legal rules—or more
accurately, the lack thereof—have contributed to concentration by
allowing large farms to take advantage of scale economies while
externalizing the costs of their larger, bulked-up operations. Large
farms enjoying scale economies make larger profits. Normally these
farms would also have to abide by a system of land use,
environmental, and other laws requiring them to account for their
social and environmental costs. If those laws were observed and
enforced, they would help strike a balance between greater
profitability and larger externalities. But these laws are not widely
observed and not rigorously enforced, upsetting this balance and
giving large-scale farms cost advantages while insulating them from
corresponding responsibilities.
land_concentration_The_example_of_France (discussing similar effects of similar policies
in France); Michael J. Roberts & Nigel Key, Agricultural Payments and Land
Concentration: A Semiparametric Spatial Regression Analysis, 90 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
627, 640 (2008); Simone Severini & Antonella Tantari, The Impact of Agricultural Policy
on Farm Income Concentration: The Case of Regional Implementation of the CAP Direct
Payments in Italy, 44 AGRIC. ECON. 275, 284 (2013) (concluding that a direct payment
policy reduced the concentration of farm ownership caused by past agricultural subsidies);
Justin Spittler et al., The Economic Impact of Agricultural Subsidies in the United States,
36 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 301, 305 (2011).
4 Nigel D. Key & Michael J. Roberts, Do Government Payments Influence Farm Size
and Survival?, 32 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 330, 346 (2007) (“Government payments
were found to be positively associated with the likelihood of farm survival, and the
magnitude of this association was generally greater for larger farms. Also, a small but
statistically significant positive association was found between payments and farm size
growth, and the magnitude of this effect increased with the size of the operation.”);
Roberts & Key, supra note 3, at 627.
5 Roberts & Key, supra note 3, at 640.
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Perhaps nowhere in agriculture are these trends more visible than
in the hog industry. Over the past three decades, the American hog
industry has undergone a remarkable transformation from one based
on small-scale, localized production to one based on large-scale,
6
decentralized production. American hog farming has become
concentrated in the sense that a handful of large corporations now
7
own the vast majority of hogs raised in the United States. But hog
farming has also become decentralized in the sense that different
phases of hog raising are now frequently delegated to different farms.
Instead of raising a hog from birth to slaughter, large livestock
conglomerates contract out different phases of hog production to
individual hog farms, but maintain tight control over the entire
8
process from birth to slaughter to processing to marketing. This has
achieved some gains in efficiency because different phases of hog
raising require slightly different sets of expertise. This modern and
newly efficient American hog industry has produced record-low
9
consumer prices and become an export juggernaut, elevating the
United States from a bit player in international markets to the largest
10
pork exporter in the world.
The massive scaling-up of hog production, however, has come with
a heavy environmental and social price tag. The restructuring of hog
production to occur almost exclusively on large, industrialized,
11
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), has introduced a
number of environmental problems that were insignificant when
12
production was dominated by smaller farms. Farms expanding to
take advantage of economies of scale are able to lower their average
6 PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE:
INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 5–6 (2008) [hereinafter PEW],
http://www ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf.
7 Id. (The chicken industry is even more integrated and concentrated than hog farms,
whereas the dairy and beef cattle industries are less so.).
8 WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE & NIGEL KEY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., U.S. HOG PRODUCTION FROM 1992 TO 2009: TECHNOLOGY, RESTRUCTURING,
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 5–8 (2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1207987/err
158.pdf.
9 Id. at 33–34.
10 Hogs & Pork: Pork Exports, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC, ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/hogs-pork/trade.aspx#exports
(last
updated Mar. 24, 2015).
11 Regulatory Definitions of Large CAFOs, Medium CAFO, and Small CAFOs, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/sector_table.pdf (last visited Oct.
23, 2015) (providing working definitions of what constitutes a CAFO).
12 See discussion infra Part II.
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costs as production volume increases. But the opposite is true of the
harm from pollution. Pollution costs increase exponentially with
volume, so that the marginal harm from the five thousandth cow, hog,
14
or chicken is greater than that from the tenth cow, hog, or chicken.
Farm size expansion is thus a mixed bag of higher profits and greater
social harms. Environmental and land use laws are supposed to
provide a check on the uncontrolled growth of livestock operations,
ensuring that the negative externalities of larger livestock farms are
commensurate with the economic benefits. But these environmental
and land use laws have been neutered and their countervailing
influences erased, allowing large livestock operations, such as hog
CAFOs, to flourish.
The forgiveness of these environmental insults is a matter of
15
common agricultural and environmental policy as well as an
obvious subsidy for large hog CAFOs. What is less obvious is that
environmental laxity, as applied to large hog CAFOs, actually injures
smaller hog farms and is helping to drive them out of existence. Most
individual hog farmers have become outside contractors, providing
the large firms with facilities and waste management services, but
little of the knowledge and animal husbandry that characterized
traditional hog farming. The implicit legal bias towards large CAFOs
has marginalized all operations that do not fall under this category.
Under the patina of defending the bucolic farm life, large agricultural
conglomerates have actually decimated farming life to make room for
CAFOs. Nowhere has this been more sharply illustrated than in hog
farming.
This Article examines five areas of law which have biased hog
production towards larger, more intensive farms: (1) state right-tofarm laws, (2) the Clean Water Act, (3) the Clean Air Act, (4) Food
13 ROBERT A. HOPPE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ARGIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SMALL
FARMS IN THE UNITED STATES: PERSISTENCE UNDER PRESSURE 28 (2010), http://www
.ers.usda.gov/media/147007/eib63_1_.pdf.
14 See, e.g., David Letson et al., Point/Nonpoint Source Trading for Controlling
Pollutant Loadings to Coastal Waters: A Feasibility Study, in THEORY, MODELING AND
EXPERIENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION 123, 127 (Clifford
S. Russell & Jason F. Shogren eds., 1993) (modeling the convex damage function); James
S. Shortle & James W. Dunn, The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water
Pollution Control Policies, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 668, 670 (1986) (modeling a water
quality damage function as being convex, or increasing nonlinearly); Rodney B.W. Smith
& Theodore D. Tomasi, Transaction Costs and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water
Pollution Control Policies, 20 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 277, 279 (1995) (assuming convex
water quality damage function).
15 See discussion infra Part II.
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and Drug Administration oversight of the administration of antibiotics
to farm animals, and (5) the Packers and Stockyards Act. Each of
these areas of law has its own focus, with its own regulatory sphere
that somehow touches on the production of livestock. And
agricultural interests in each of these areas have successfully lobbied
to essentially be left alone, carrying out agricultural operations as they
see fit, without regulatory or private interference. The resulting freefor-all in a regulatory vacuum has created a hog industry that is highly
concentrated, politically organized, and brutal in defending its
economic position.
This Article proposes a reform agenda centered upon the economic
effects that each of these five areas of law have on the
industrialization of hog production. Part I of this Article sets out a
brief description and history of the hog industry, with attention
towards productivity and externalities. Part II of this Article sets out
the five different areas of law that have abetted concentration in the
hog industry through legal policies which tend to overlook the harms
caused by large hog farms. Part III of this Article presents some
normative arguments for not only halting, but reversing, some of the
concentration that has occurred in the hog industry over the past two
decades. This Article then concludes with some general observations
about hog farming, agriculture, and trends towards industry
concentration.
I
THE HOG INDUSTRY
The hog industry has never been glamorous, but it has long been an
16
important component of the American livestock industry. In 2012,
over twenty billion pounds of pork and pork products were
17
produced from hogs raised on about sixty thousand hog farms in the

16 See generally Per Capita Consumption of Poultry and Livestock, 1965 to Estimated
2016, in Pounds, NAT’L CHICKEN COUNCIL, http://www nationalchickencouncil.org
/about-the-industry/statistics/per-capita-consumption-of-poultry-and-livestock-1965-to
-estimated-2012-in-pounds (comparing consumption rates of commonly eaten meats) (last
updated July 10, 2015).
17 Pork: Supply and Disappearance (Carcass Weight, Million Pounds) and Per Capita
Disappearance (Pounds), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda
.gov/datafiles/Livestock_Meat_Domestic_Data/Quarterly_red_meat_poultry_and_egg
_supply_and_disappearance_and_per_capita_disappearance/Pork/WASDE_PorkFull.pdf
(last updated Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Pork Supply and Disappearance].
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United States. American pork production, taking into account the
cyclical nature of agricultural commodities, has increased fairly
19
steadily at an average rate of 1.25% per year from 1970. Inventory
of live hogs in the United States has also ticked upward, from about
20
fifty-three million in 1969 to just over sixty-six million in 2012—an
21
average increase of about 0.5% per year. That production has
increased more quickly than inventory, reflecting the industrial trend
22
of producing larger hogs for slaughter.
These unspectacular trend figures, however, mask the stunning
transformation of the hog industry from small-scale production to
large-scale production. In 1969, only 7% of all hogs were on farms of
23
a thousand or more hogs. In 2012, that figure had risen to almost
24
96%. From 1969 to 2012, the number of hog farms in the United
States fell by seven-eighths, while hog production steadily
25
increased. Hog farming has become intensely concentrated: almost
three thousand farms had five thousand or more hogs—a category that
26
did not even exist in 1992. One hundred and thirty hog owners—
27
0.2% of all hog owners—collectively own 57% of all hogs.
Perhaps nothing symbolizes the industrialization and concentration
of hog farming as much as the trend towards contract farming. Most
individual hog farmers no longer own the hogs they handle. In 1992,
only 3% of all inventoried hogs in the United States were being raised
28
under a contractual arrangement; now that number is 71%.
Vertically integrated corporations—ones that assume the entire
29
production and marketing undertaking—own the hogs and contract
18 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE – STATE DATA 359–66 tbl.12
(2014) [hereinafter USDA 2012 CENSUS], http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications
/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2_US_State_Level/st99_2_012_012.pdf.
19 Pork Supply and Disappearance, supra note 17. Calculations derived from the data
are on file with the author.
20 USDA 2012 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 359–66 tbl.12. Calculations derived from the
data are on file with the author.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 In 1969, there were over 532,000 hog farms in the United States; in 2012, there were
about 63,000. Id.
26 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 10.
27 Id. at 4.
28 Id. at 14.
29 Betsy Freese, Pork Powerhouses 2010: Back in Black, AGRICULTURE.COM (Sept. 17,
2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.agriculture.com/livestock/ pk-powerhouses-2010-back-in
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30

with individual farmers to handle a particular phase of hog rearing
31
under very specific parameters set out by the corporation. A typical
production contract might provide that an integrated firm will deliver
32
a certain number of hogs on a certain date, and that the firm will
provide “general instructions with respect to the care and husbandry
33
It typically requires the contractor to agree to
of [hogs].”
acknowledge receipt of, and to comply with the requirements of a hog
34
“handbook.” The firm retains rights of inspection, and contractors
35
agree to forbid access to the hogs unless approved by the firm. Feed
and veterinary services are supplied to the contractor from the
36
corporation exclusively. Contractors are prohibited from going
outside of the corporation for anything affecting the welfare of the
37
hogs. Unmistakably, large livestock conglomerates have taken
charge of the production process. For their efforts, they have been
38
able to achieve clear gains in efficiency.
Contract farming implies a vertically integrated production
process. The point of contract farming from the perspective of the
integrated firm is to eliminate the variability in production, pool risks,
and to be able to optimize production from birth to slaughter to
39
A vertically integrated firm pools
processing to marketing.
information in a way that would be extremely difficult for a network
of hog farmers to do. For example, it is difficult for an individual hog
farmer to find the best breeding boars and sows from among hundreds
of thousands, translate anticipated future market conditions into

-black_275-ar9803. Smithfield Foods, the largest hog conglomerate, owns about nine
hundred thousand breeding sows, see id., and fifteen million hogs overall. Eliza Barclay,
Smithfield Prods Its Pork Suppliers to Dump Pig Crates, NPR: THE SALT (Jan. 7, 2014,
11:57 AM), http://www npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/01/07/260439063/smithfield-prods-its
-pork-suppliers-to-dump-pig-crates.
30 Barclay, supra note 29. Smithfield Foods has approximately twenty-one hundred
contracts. Id.
31 Nigel Key & William McBride, Production Contracts and Productivity in the U.S.
Hog Sector, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 121, 121 (2003).
32 E.g., Contract, Christensen Farms & Feedlots, Inc. cl. 4.C (Mar. 14, 2001) (on file
with author).
33 Id. at cl. 3.C.
34 Id. at cl. 4.K.
35 Id. at cl. 5.
36 Id. at cl. 3.C.
37 Id. at cl. 6.A.
38 Key & McBride, supra note 31, at 121.
39 Id. at 122.
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production decisions, and shuttle hogs among a network of farms to
minimize transportation costs. Vertically integrated firms exercise
tight control over feed administered to their hogs, which provides
uniformity but also offers an opportunity to experiment with different
feed mixtures (such as adding antibiotics for growth promotion
40
purposes). By virtue of their size, vertically integrated firms are able
41
to ferret out the best price for feed—the largest cost of hog farming.
Vertical integration ironically breaks up hog farming into different
42
stages. Traditional “farrow-to-finish” hog farms birthed piglets on
the farm and raised them to slaughter weight, feeding them corn and
soybean that was grown on the farm itself. Hogs were traditionally
sold at local markets, which were in turn connected to larger
43
distribution networks. Meanwhile, the modern, vertically integrated
farming operation may have one type of hog farm that breeds hogs,
another that farrows piglets and weans them, and another that fattens
44
them to slaughter weight. Then, the hogs are sent to an in-house
slaughterhouse that is operated to accept hogs at just the right time so
45
as to operate at near capacity. This separation of hog-raising phases
has allowed livestock conglomerates to realize efficiencies by
specialization. Individual hog farmers have, by specializing in a
particular phase, become marginally more proficient at breeding,
weaning, or finishing, and thus marginally more effective as hog
46
Slaughterhouses, as well, have grown in size and
farmers.
specialization—segregating slaughter into different types of pork cuts
and products—to further take advantage of economies of scale and
40

See discussion infra Part II.D.
MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 15; Timothy A. Wise & Sarah E. Trist, Buyer
Power in the U.S. Hog Markets: A Critical Review of the Literature (Glob. Dev. & Env’t
Inst., Working Paper No. 10-04, 2010), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/10-04
HogBuyerPower.pdf.
42 Farrow-to-finish is typically a confinement operation where hogs are bred and raised
to their slaughter weight, usually 225–300 pounds. Facilities with a capacity of 2500 or
more swine are considered by the EPA to be CAFOs subject to point source pollution
permit requirements. Other types of hog operations include farrow-to-feeder pig, feeder
pig-to-finish, weanling-to-feeder pig, and farrow-to-weanling. WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE &
NIGEL KEY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO.
818, ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS IN U.S. HOG PRODUCTION 2 (2003),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/488755/aer818_1_.pdf.
43 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 5.
44 JAMES M. MACDONALD, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO. 785, CONSOLIDATION IN U.S. MEATPACKING 6 (2000),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/493235/aer785_1_.pdf.
45 Id.
46 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 1.
41
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47

further reduce costs.
Notoriously volatile spot markets, the
traditional means of marketing finished hogs, now account for only
48
8% of sales, down from 62% in 1994. Spot markets also happen to
49
be how most small hog farms market their finished hogs.
The pursuit of economies of scale drives this supersizing and
50
specialization of hog operations. The difference can be dramatic:
among farrow-to-finish operations that raise hogs from birth to
slaughter, a farm of less than five hundred hogs incurred operating
expenses more than twice that of farms with five thousand or more
51
hogs. That large of a gap effectively consigns anything less than a
mega-farm, or very large CAFO, to supplying “niche” pork markets,
where consumers are willing to pay a premium for hogs raised in
52
more humane conditions or produce fewer environmental problems.
Outside of niche markets, profit margins in hog farming are
tantalizingly small—but narrow advantages multiplied over large
volumes of hogs translate into potentially decisive competitive
advantages. For example, feeder-to-finish operations, which take
weaned hogs and fatten them to slaughter weight, yield a relatively
small cost advantage for operations with five thousand or more hogs
over those with fewer than five hundred hogs: roughly a 20% cost
savings. But that is enough to have driven most production on feeder53
to-finish farms onto larger farms.
The late Nobel Laureate economist Ronald Coase wrote in 1937
that the nature of a firm was to reduce the transaction costs of doing
54
business. Internalizing different aspects of production could save a
47

MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 45, at 5–6.
Glenn Grimes & Ron Plain, U.S. Hog Marketing Contract Study tbl.1 (Univ. of Mo.
Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Working Paper AEWP 2009-1, 2009), http://agebb missouri.edu
/mkt/vertstud09 htm.
49 DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
CAFOS
UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 22
(2008),
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and
_agriculture/cafos-uncovered.pdf.
50 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 42, at 1 (“Economies of size are a form of cost
variation among farms based on the premise that larger farms have lower per unit costs
than smaller farms. Therefore, farms will become larger over time as smaller farms exit
the industry or expand to take advantage of lower costs.”).
51 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 12.
52 Peter J. Lammers et al., Foreword to NICHE PORK PRODUCTION (2007), http://www
.ipic.iastate.edu/publications/IPICNPP.pdf.
53 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 11 tbl.2 (showing that feeder-to-finish hog farms
averaged 7222 hog sales or removals in 2009).
54 See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
48
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firm costs by dispensing with partners that may or may not be reliable
or forthright or that may harbor different assumptions about the
55
transaction. Coase certainly did not have the hog industry in mind,
but its evolution serves as an elegant example of transaction cost
56
economics, the field that Coase’s works have spawned. The hog
industry is an apt example of an industry trying to minimize
transaction costs. While the hog industry has not become one gigantic
firm, it has moved in that direction with its vertical integration model.
The hog industry will never be able to completely insulate itself from
commodity price fluctuations or weather-induced losses, but it can
diversify its risk and control just about every aspect of hog production
by integrating production under one central clearinghouse. Livestock
conglomerates, possessing a menu of productivity-improving and
risk-spreading techniques, have sought to bring far-flung operations
in-house, or contractually secured cooperation in incorporating those
techniques into hog production. The result is an industry that has
drastically reduced the uncertainty involved with hog farming, and
lowered a wide array of transaction costs associated with the
production of a notoriously volatile commodity.
At first glance, the newly efficient and highly concentrated hog
industry would appear to have a smaller footprint than the traditional,
small-scale, farrow-to-finish farm. The loss of almost half of a million
hog farms has likely released hundreds of thousands of acres of land
57
to other uses, some of them other farm uses. But the impacts of the
new, supersized CAFOs extend well beyond property lines.
Traditional farrow-to-finish hog farms were often part of larger, cropgrowing farms, which raised a relatively small number of hogs. Hogs
were fed surplus crops that were grown on that same farm, and hog
manure was disposed of by spreading it on the adjoining, on-site
crops. At such small scales, manure can be applied to growing crops
without producing an excess that would spill off into nearby
waterways during heavy rains. But the modern large hog CAFO
55

See id.
See generally, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960); Douglass C. North & John J. Wallis, Integrating Institutional Change and
Technical Change in Economic History a Transaction Cost Approach, 150 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 609 (1994); Stewart J. Schwab, Coase’s Twin
Towers: The Relation Between The Nature of the Firm and The Problem of Social Cost, 18
J. CORP. L. 359 (1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural
Progression, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 673 (2010).
57 See, e.g., Jacqueline Waymack, Agricultural Preservation Techniques in Virginia, 18
COLONIAL LAW. 11, 11 (1989).
56
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generates far more manure than could be safely applied to on-site
58
crops without polluting nearby waters. Special handling is required,
often by paying other farmers to accept their excess manure for crop
59
fertilization. Failing that, CAFOs may or may not fully comply with
local, state, or federal laws regulating agricultural runoff. In terms of
feed, the vertically integrated hog industry also relies on a
sophisticated and calibrated system of feed supply that obtains feed
off-site and transports it to individual contract hog farmers, generating
60
a different mix for each stage of hog production. That system of
industrial feed production, which requires energy-intensive fertilizer
and generates a transportation footprint, produces a wider and more
61
harmful array of environmental effects.
Large CAFOs are a creature not only of economics, but also legal
policy. As they have emerged in the last four decades, they have not
only transformed production and consumption of meat, but have also
created a widening circle of environmental and social impacts. This
Article catalogs those outsized environmental and social impacts, and
shows how legal rules and institutions have largely given CAFOs a
pass, allowing them to outcompete and displace smaller farms.
II
LEGAL POLICIES LEADING TO LARGER CAFOS
A. State Right-to-Farm Laws
In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., the
Supreme Court of Arizona predictably held that a property developer
could successfully recover in nuisance against a nearby foul-smelling
62
cattle feedlot. From a jurisprudential point of view, it was not even
58

MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 36.
“Excess” means the amount of manure that can be applied on adjoining crops
without causing nutrient overloading. MARC RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO. 824, MANURE MANAGEMENT FOR
WATER QUALITY COSTS TO ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS OF APPLYING MANURE
NUTRIENTS TO LAND 6 (2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=757884.
60 See NIGEL KEY & WILLIAM MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF U.S. HOG PRODUCTION 9 (2007); Nigel Key,
Production Contracts and Farm Business Growth and Survival, 45 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED
ECON. 277, 278 (2013).
61 It should be noted that the special feed is also more efficient in reducing hog waste.
MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 36.
62 494 P.2d 700, 707–08 (Ariz. 1972).
59
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surprising that the plaintiff developer won despite actively expanding
his retirement community towards the cattle feedlot, which had been
operating for years. The “coming to the nuisance” defense has long
been declared, in most states, to be an incomplete defense to a
63
But the legislative backlash following Spur
nuisance claim.
Industries took everyone by surprise. It was as if some inchoate
discomfort with nuisance laws suddenly exploded into plain view, and
the Spur Industries case became a fulcrum for political action to
reverse, state-by-state, its holding.
Between 1976 and 1991, every single state and Puerto Rico passed
64
some form of a right-to-farm (RTF) law. To widely varying
degrees, RTF laws provide farms with a defense to nuisance claims
brought by plaintiffs that migrate toward—or “come to”—any
allegedly nuisance-creating farm. RTF laws thus reverse a trend
towards diminishing the importance of the coming to the nuisance
65
defense. While most commonwealth jurisdictions have relegated the
coming to the nuisance defense to being just one factor in a
multifactor analysis, RTF laws resurrect it as an absolute defense. At
least with respect to farms, nuisance lawsuits have become
66
considerably more difficult to win.
RTF laws commonly set out some definition of the agricultural
operations that can raise the defense, a list of permitted operational
changes that can be undertaken without losing the defense, and some
time limit that serves as an effective statute of limitations on any
claims of nuisance against a farm. The stated purpose of RTF laws is
to preserve agricultural lands and protect them against the
67
encroaching sprawl of residential development. Why should a cattle
63 See, e.g., Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504, 508 (Me. 1996); Mark v.
Oregon ex rel. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 84 P.3d 155, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
64 Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative
Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103,
103–04 (1998).
65 Id. at 104.
66 See Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the
Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 305 (1984) (“In enacting the right-tofarm laws, the various state legislatures have made the policy judgment that the social
benefits of retaining land in agriculture are so critical that, rather than allowing courts to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether an agricultural use is reasonable, the balance
between agriculture and other uses should always be tipped toward agriculture.”).
67 E.g., IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9(b) (2015) (“The general assembly declares that it is the
policy of the state to conserve, protect, and encourage the development and improvement
of its agricultural products. The general assembly finds that when nonagricultural land
uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural operations often become the subject of
nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease
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feedlot or hog farm that started out in the middle of nowhere have to
continually worry about the approaching advance of property
developers? It seemed not only grossly unfair, but counterproductive
to make them dance around the whim and caprice of developers.
But RTF laws do not protect all agricultural lands. In Parker v.
Obert’s Legacy Dairy, an Indiana court heard a nuisance claim
brought by one neighbor, an owner of a hobby farm, against another
neighbor, a dairy farm that grew from 100 to 760 dairy cows in a
68
The difference between the two farms is that
single year.
defendant’s farm was large enough to be a nuisance due to the amount
69
of manure, and thus odor, it caused; plaintiff’s was not. As
demonstrated in Obert’s Legacy Dairy, most serious nuisance
70
lawsuits are filed against large and very large CAFOs, and most
71
commonly complaining of the odors they generate. The odors from
hog CAFOs are particularly strong—studies have decomposed hog
operations, and many persons may be discouraged from making investments in farm
improvements. It is the purpose of this section to reduce the loss to the state of its
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural operations
may be deemed to be a nuisance.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015) (with nearly
identical language).
68 988 N.E.2d 319, 320–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The court granted summary judgment
for the larger dairy farm, finding that Indiana’s right-to-farm law “insulate[d] the Obert’s
expansion of their dairy farm from nuisance suits under these circumstances.” Id. at 325.
For further discussion about the impact of the Obert’s Legacy Dairy case, see infra notes
80–82 and accompanying text.
69 Id. at 320.
70 See, e.g., Initial Case Management Order, In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No.
5:15-CV-13-BR (E.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2015). Murphy-Brown LLC, the defendant in this mass
litigation, is a hog producer for Smithfield Foods. Welcome to Smithfield’s Hog
Production Division, MURPHY BROWN LLC, http://www murphybrownllc.com/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2015).
71 E.g., Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“We must
observe that pork production generates odors which cannot be prevented, and so long as
the human race consumes pork, someone must tolerate the smell.”); Weinhold v. Wolff,
555 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1996) (odor preventing neighbors from sleeping); Flansburgh
v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Neb. 1985) (odor causing watering eyes and breathing
problems); JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 13:3 (3d ed. 2013); Harrison M.
Pittman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-Farm Acts, 8 A.L.R. 6th 465
(2005); J. Patrick Wheeler, Livestock Odor & Nuisance Actions vs. “Right-to-Farm”
Laws: Report by Defendant Farmer’s Attorney, 68 N.D. L. REV. 459, 460–63 (1992)
(summarizing a wide variety of cases of nuisance lawsuits involving odors from hog
farms); Tomislav Vukina et al., Swine Odor Nuisance: Voluntary Negotiation, Litigation,
and Regulation: North Carolina’s Experience, 11 CHOICES, First Quarter 1996, at 26
(“The strongest public opposition has focused on offensive odors released from hog barns
and manure-collecting lagoons of these large hog operations.”).
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manure odors into over three hundred discrete compounds; a handful
of them are harmful to human health, and some score very high on
72
subjective assessments of odor strength. Even in milder cases where
odors may not cause health problems, they can still inhibit outdoor
73
activity. RTF laws wield their greatest significance when they
protect these large-scale farms from nuisance suits, but they do not
play a significant role in protecting the vast majority of the smaller74
scale farms, which emit noxious odors in much smaller doses.
Should large or very large CAFOs enjoy an absolute coming to the
nuisance defense? Lockean concepts of property ownership, vesting
75
property rights in those that have mixed their labor with the land,
lend an appeal to the defense of farmers in particular. And a first-in76
time, first-in-right rule offers simplicity and predictability. But a
coming to the nuisance defense is a form of grandfathering, a
differentiation of right on the basis of priority. Allocating a property
priority to first settlers is to choose a particular point in time—the
establishment of a CAFO—as the time for a baseline condition. But
that is an arbitrary choice. There is no reason to allow noxious land
uses to continue just because they were there first. The first land use,
which in some cases began hundreds of years ago, says little about the
best current land use.

72 Susan S. Schiffman et al., Quantification of Odors and Odorants from Swine
Operations in North Carolina, 108 AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY 213, 236–38
(2001).
73 Flansburgh, 370 N.W.2d at 130 (“They can no longer have backyard cookouts, and
their grandchildren cannot play outside.”); see also K.M. Thu, Public Health Concerns for
Neighbors of Large-Scale Swine Production Operations, 8 J. AGRIC. SAFETY & HEALTH
175, 178 (2002).
74 See generally, e.g., MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, ENV’T & DEV.
SERIES 7, SMALL FARMS AS A PLANETARY ECOLOGICAL ASSET: FIVE KEY REASONS
WHY WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE REVITALIZATION OF SMALL FARMS IN THE GLOBAL
SOUTH 7 (2008), http://twn my/title/end/pdf/end07.pdf; Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd,
Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is Small More Sustainable?, 28 J. AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. 73, 73–78 (1996).
75 Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land
Conservation: A Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 606 (2002) (“Property
arises, in Locke’s familiar allegory, through labor: someone removes something from the
state of nature, making it her property, by mixing her sweat with it.”); see also Anne C.
Dowling, Note, “Un-Locke-ing” a “Just Right” Environmental Regime: Overcoming the
Three Bears of International Environmentalism – Sovereignty, Locke, and Compensation,
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 891, 912–18 (2002) (providing background on
Lockean property rights theories).
76 See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 11–13 (6th ed. 2006)
(explaining the history and application of the first in time principle).
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This line of argument has particular relevance in critically
considering RTF laws. The prevailing evidence suggests that CAFOs
77
cause significant devaluation of neighboring residential properties.
Not only does the ubiquitous odor of hog CAFOs cause houses for
sale to show poorly every single day of the year, but air pollutants
78
pose significant health risks for neighboring residents. And, if
CAFOs and residential property are mutually exclusive land uses,
there is no reason to begin with the presumption that CAFOs are the
more valuable use.
Finally, it is worth noting that some RTF laws do not stop at
protecting existing CAFOs. Parker v. Obert’s Legacy Dairy upheld a
fairly long-standing interpretation of Indiana’s RTF law as protecting
79
not only existing farms, but also farms that expand operations. As
long as a farm’s operational changes are not “fundamental” or
80
“significant,” RTF laws preserve its grandfathered status. The
defendant Obert’s Legacy Dairy expanded from about a hundred
81
cows to over seven hundred (not a large CAFO by today’s standards
but a dramatic upsizing). The court held that such an increase was not
a “significant change” in the type of agricultural operation, and could
therefore not be the subject of a nuisance lawsuit brought by
82
neighbors. Apparently, the Indiana RTF law not only grandfathers
in every farm, but grants it license to expand without limit, so long as

77 Joseph A. Herriges et al., Living With Hogs in Iowa: The Impact of Livestock
Facilities on Rural Residential Property Values, 81 LAND ECON. 530 (2005); Jungik Kim
et al., Economic Impact and Public Costs of Confined Animal Feeding Operations at the
Parcel Level of Craven County, North Carolina, 27 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 29, 39–41
(2010); Katherine Milla et al., Evaluating the Effect of Proximity to Hog Farms on
Residential Property Values: A GIS-Based Hedonic Price Model Approach, 17 URB. &
REGIONAL INFO. SYS. ASS’N J. 27, 30–31 (2005); Raymond B. Palmquist et al., Hog
Operations, Environmental Effects, and Residential Property Values, 73 LAND ECON. 114
tbl.3 (1997); Isaac Bayoh et al., The Value of Clean Dairy Air: Accounting for
Endogeneity and Spatially Correlated Errors in a Hedonic Analyses of the Impact of
Animal Operations on Local Property Values 18–20 (Am. Agric. Econ. Ass’n Annual
Meeting, Denver Colo., Selected Paper, 2004), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream
/20364 /1/sp04ba04.pdf.
78 See infra Part II.C.
79 988 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
80 E.g., Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, 517 F. App’x 518, 519 (7th Cir. 2013);
Obert’s Legacy Dairy, 988 N.E.2d at 324–25; Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., Inc., 550 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990); Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
81 Obert’s Legacy Dairy, 988 N.E.2d at 321.
82 Id. at 324.
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it does not dramatically change the “type” of operations. Though, if
expanding from one hundred to over seven hundred animals is not a
significant change, then one is hard-pressed to imagine what is.
RTF laws do not actually protect farms. Despite the label, RTF
laws are an implicit subsidy for large CAFOs and, as such, are an
assault on small farms. In creating a legal right to farm, state
legislatures have unwittingly helped create economic conditions that
have made it impossible for small farmers to exercise that right.
B. Failure to Regulate CAFOs Under the Clean Water Act
Traditional, small-scale hog production applies the hog manure to
adjacent crops, saving on the need for synthetic, commercial
84
fertilizers. Large CAFOs, on the other hand, produce more manure
than can be applied to adjacent crops, so manure is stored in tanks or
85
lagoons for future application on nearby land—or so it is hoped.
Poor manure handling and storage practices generate excess runoff
86
and pollute surface waters. Unless manure is treated or moved offsite, available cropland and pasture can only accept a fraction of the
amount of manure that is produced before excess nitrogen and
87
phosphorus “loading” occurs, which degrades water quality. The
seepage and runoff from manure lagoons cause water bodies to
experience algal blooms. In turn, algal blooms can create a variety of
other ecological problems, including further oxygen depletion,
prevention of photosynthesis through blocked sunlight, and the
emission of toxins such as Pfisteria and fecal pathogens, such as
88
Giardia and Cryptosporidium. These toxins and fecal pathogens can
89
either kill fish and wildlife, or render them unfit for consumption.
Nitrogen is also released indirectly into water bodies by the air
83

Id.

84 JOHN

A. LORY & RAY MASSEY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING MANURE AS A
FERTILIZER FOR CROP PRODUCTION 3–4 (2006), http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds
/named/msbasin/upload/2006_8_25_msbasin_symposia_ia_session8.pdf; RIBAUDO ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 16–20.
85 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 5–6.
86 Id. at 5–8.
87 CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES
4–5 (Mark Schultz ed., 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos
_nalboh.pdf.
88 Id.
89 Id.; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLEAN COASTAL WATERS:
UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING THE EFFECTS OF NUTRIENT POLLUTION 14–16 (2000);
RIBAUDO ET AL, supra note 59, at 5–8.
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90

emissions of ammonia, which is redeposited onto land and water.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated in 2003
that 5% of all CAFOs produced 50% of regularly farmed animals
91
92
(cows, hogs, and chickens) and 65% of excess nutrient runoff.
Large CAFOs commonly store manure in pits directly beneath the
slatted floors of a hog barn, where they will remain until it is pumped
93
out to be spread onto crops at the right time. However, the manure
may remain in the storage pit for as long as one year, during which
time it is emitting odors, harmful air pollutants, and the powerful
94
More commonly, and even more
greenhouse gas methane.
environmentally offensive, is the practice of simply storing hog
manure in an open-air surface lagoon, where it runs off into
95
waterways during rains. Heavy rain events create large spills of hog
manure into waterways, killing thousands of fish and shellfish at a
time, and possibly necessitating the closure of local fisheries for
96
weeks or months. There is also the strong suggestion that the
application of hog manure on crops has polluted groundwater
97
supplies.

90 John T. Walker et al., Atmospheric Transport and Wet Deposition of Ammonium in
North Carolina, 34 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T. 3407, 3407–08 (2000).
91 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66
Fed. Reg. 2960, 2986 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412).
92 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 63.
93 Anaerobic Digestion on Swine Operations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/agstar/anaerobic/swine html (last updated Dec. 18, 2014).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Michael A. Mallin et al., Comparative Effects of Poultry and Swine Waste Lagoon
Spills on the Quality of Receiving Streamwaters, 26 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1622, 1622
(1997); Michael A. Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on Rivers and
Estuaries, 88 AM. SCIENTIST 26, 26 (2000).
97 MARK F. BECKER ET AL., OKLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD, & FORESTRY, WATERRES. INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 02-4257, POSSIBLE SOURCES OF NITRATE IN GROUND
WATER AT SWINE LICENSED-MANAGED FEEDING OPERATIONS IN OKLAHOMA, 2001 17–
22 (2002), http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri024257/; Angela L. Batt et al., Occurrence of
Sulfonamide Antimicrobials in Private Water Wells in Washington County, Idaho, USA, 64
CHEMOSPHERE 1963, 1963 (2006), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1017&context=watercenterpubs; R.L. Huffman & P.W. Westerman, Estimated
Seepage Losses from Established Swine Waste Lagoons in the Lower Coastal Plain of
North Carolina, 38 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC’Y AGRIC. ENGINEERS 449, 449 (1995); C.
Volland et al., Cost of Remediation of Nitrogen-Contaminated Soils Under CAFO
Impoundments, 4 J. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RES. 3-1, 3-2 (2003).

42

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94, 23

Under hog contract arrangements, it is usually the contract
growers—and not the conglomerates—that are responsible for
98
manure management and disposing of it properly. Conglomerates
have used their market power over contract growers to devolve
99
themselves of the major pollution control expense. Individual
contract growers often do not have sufficient margins to adequately
100
treat pollution.
Contract growers, lacking deep pockets, are also
101
and are thus used by the
more sympathetic regulatory targets,
conglomerates as de facto human shields in the regulatory war they
wage with environmental regulators.
For all the trouble it causes, the cost of controlling water pollution
created by hog manure is not very high. The cost of large CAFOs to
comply with EPA standards for manure lagoons and sprayfield
systems, which collect hog manure and spray it onto a field using a
102
sprinkler system, is about $3.72 per finished hog, which translates
into 1.6¢ per pound of pork produced from a two hundred and fifty
pound hog. Additional techniques, such as construction of a wetland
with specialized plants and soil to act as a filter, cost virtually
103
nothing. But in an industry with tight margins, even small costs are
at least perceived to be an existential threat to business.
The mass production of hog manure also introduces an opportunity
to profit, an opportunity which has been largely spurned by hog
farmers. “Anaerobic digesters” sequester hog manure—not only
capturing odors and air pollutants, but producing methane, which can
104
This creates a dual benefit:
be used to generate electricity.
98

PEW, supra note 6, at 6; Christensen Farms & Feedlots, Inc., supra note 32, at cl.

4.G.
99 KATHRYN COCHRAN ET AL., ENVTL. DEF., DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE HOG WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 15–18 (2000).
100 PEW, supra note 6, at 6; Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility:
Changing Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production,
93 CAL. L. REV. 797, 799 (2005).
101 Philippe Bontems et al., Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production
Contracts, in FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND
LIABILITY 265, 265 (Marcel Boyer et al. eds., 2006).
102 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 19; see also N.C. State Univ., Dep’t of Agric. &
Res. Econ., Technology Report: Anaerobic Lagoon and Sprayfield: Cost and Returns
Analysis of Manure Management Systems Evaluated in 2004 Under the North Carolina
Attorney General Agreements with Smithfield Foods, Premium Standard Farms, and Front
Line Farmers 3–4 (July 2005) (unpublished report), http://www.cals ncsu.edu/waste_mgt
/smithfield_projects/phase2report05/cd,web%20files/B1b.pdf.
103 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 19–20.
104 ANDREW E. DESSLER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CLIMATE CHANGE 77–79
(2012) (Methane is a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming, that is
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sequestering a powerful greenhouse gas and creating an energy
105
source. Anaerobic digesters pump hog manure into a zero-oxygen
container (hence the term anaerobic), in which bacterial
decomposition converts the manure and emitted gases into a solid
106
The
organic waste and a gaseous mixture that includes methane.
resulting solid waste is a fertilizer, but is much less volatile and thus
less polluting than the unprocessed hog manure, and the resulting gas
107
Eliminated during the
can be combusted to generate electricity.
process are the byproducts of the odor that have spawned so many
108
nuisance lawsuits,
the air pollutants that are harmful to human
109
110
health, the nutrients that pollute waterways, and the emission of
a greenhouse gas. Instead, there is a benefit from the process: a source
of energy.
It is hard to overstate how colossal of a market failure it is for
CAFOs to create as much pollution as they do. Ten million hogs in
the North Carolina coastal plain generate more excrement than the
populations of New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago
111
combined. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent in wastewater
112
yet the same cannot be said about
treatment in these three cities,
approximately twenty times as powerful as carbon dioxide in trapping heat.); PETER
CIBOROWSKI, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, ANAEROBIC DIGESTION OF
LIVESTOCK MANURE FOR POLLUTION CONTROL AND ENERGY PRODUCTION: A
FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT 14 (2001), http://www.pca.state mn.us/index.php/view
-document.html?gid=9244; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 20; S.M. Tauseef et al.,
Methane Capture from Livestock Manure, 117 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 187, 187 (2013)
(“Manure-based methane has been estimated to contribute 4% of all anthropogenic
methane that is presently being added up to other natural and anthropogenic sources of
global warming.”).
105 CIBOROWSKI, supra note 104, at 14.
106 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 22.
107 CIBOROWSKI, supra note 104, at 18.
108 Wheeler, supra note 71.
109 See infra Part II.C.
110 See, e.g., Catherine M.H. Keske, Anaerobic Digestion Technology: How
Agricultural Producers and the Environment Might Profit from Nuisance Lawsuits, 52
NAT. RESOURCES J. 315, 317 (2012).
111 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 7.
112 See GRACE ROBINSON CHAN, SANITATION DISTRICTS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
CALIFORNIA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT sched. 12 (2013),
http://www.lacsd.org/civica/filebank/blobdload .asp?BlobID=9018; CITY OF CHI.,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO 19 (2013), https://www mwrd.org/pv
_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_DBDBB10BBAEC275AC88E7A8C524031FAC0F02000/filename
/CAFR2013.pdf; CITY OF N.Y.C., NEW YORK CITY WATER & SEWER SYSTEM 2014: A
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30,
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CAFOs. In the long run, modest pollution control costs spent by
CAFOs could generate enormous savings in avoided water treatment
and provide countless environmental and ecological benefits. To say
this is low-hanging fruit is a gross understatement.
And yet regulation of the water pollution emanating from CAFOs
was a long-delayed and still contested process. The EPA is charged
with limiting discharges of pollution into “waters of the United
States” under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
113
114
(NPDES) in the Clean Water Act. The EPA’s mandate under the
NPDES program was clear enough with respect to CAFOs. The
115
included the
original passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972
specific words “concentrated animal feeding operations” in the
116
definition of “point source” to indicate that Congress intended for
the EPA to regulate CAFOs as it regulates industrial sources of
pollution: by issuing appropriate “effluent limitations.” In 2001, nine
years after a consent decree required the EPA to develop NPDES
117
the EPA proposed a rule that
permitting regulations for CAFOs,
would require, for the first time, CAFOs to obtain an NPDES
118
permit.
Two more years of controversy produced a final rule in
119
However, this rule was challenged by environmental
2003.
organizations on the grounds that it did not require that actual nutrient
management plans be part of NPDES permit applications. Since the
term “effluent limitation” is defined as a limit on “quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other
120
constituents” discharged,
an NPDES permit without even a
statement of how CAFOs intended to limit the amount of nutrients
escaping into waterways—never mind an actual limit on quantities,
rates, or concentrations—was not an “effluent limitation” at all.

2014 AND 2013 3 (2014), http://www nyc.gov/html/nycwaterboard/pdf/statements_and
_reports/wb_annual_report_14.pdf.
113 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
114 Id. at §§ 1251–1387.
115 Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 502(14), 86 Stat. 816, 887 (1972).
116 Id.
117 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122,
123, 412).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Waterkeeper All., Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 502 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)).
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It is certainly true that regulating the water pollution resulting from
the inappropriate handling of hog manure is a much less exact science
than even the inexact sciences of regulating industrial discharges from
an outflow pipe. By its nature, farm pollution is more diffuse, and its
inputs—livestock manure, pesticides, eroding soil—are less
susceptible of quantification. Farm pollution is thus less susceptible to
quantity, rate, or concentration regulation. Therefore, it is
understandable that the EPA might want to tackle other regulatory
challenges first. But the protracted and litigation-driven nature of the
process suggests that the EPA never, as a political matter, wished to
impose any burdens on farmers. For the EPA to make its first
proposed rule in 2001, almost thirty years after Congress instructed
the EPA to regulate CAFO discharges, is a bit ridiculous. It could
well have been longer if it were not for a lawsuit by an environmental
121
Not only that, but the 2001 rule was so weak that
organization.
122
another lawsuit filed by another environmental organization finally
forced the EPA, after another six years, to finally develop a final
123
a total of thirty-six years after Congress gave the EPA its
rule:
124
explicit marching orders.
Why has the EPA been so reluctant to regulate CAFOs when
Congress spoke so clearly? This Article is not a descriptive account of
the politics of agricultural law or policy. That is well-trod ground
125
Rather,
better left to political scientists and political economists.
121

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Waterkeeper All., Inc., 399 F.3d at 502.
123 Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response
to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,418 (Nov. 20, 2008) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 412).
124 In 2008, the EPA’s final rule was challenged by the National Pork Producers
Council, Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 635 F.3d 738 (5th Cir.
2011), and resulted in another change to the 2008 rule. The rule exempted CAFOs that
were only proposing to discharge water pollutants. National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) Reporting
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,431, 65,435 (Oct. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122).
125 See, e.g., David Freshwater, An Interview with Lee Hamilton, 9 CHOICES, Fourth
Quarter 1994, at 34 (“[E]ven though farmers are a very small percentage of the population,
and one that is getting smaller every year, they retain political clout that far exceeds their
numbers.”); Robert Paarlberg, The Political Economy of American Agricultural Policy:
Three Approaches, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1157, 1157 (1989) (“U.S. policy is said to
protect agriculture because of something distinctive in our nation’s ideology, a
Jeffersonian belief in the unique virtue of small yeomen farmers.”); Rausser, supra note 2,
at 134 (discussing inefficient “predatory” government policy as opposed to efficient
“productive” agricultural practices).
122
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this Article is a description of the extent to which law and policy have
been bent to the will of certain agricultural interests. It has not been
the will of the majority of farmers, the vast majority of which have
small farms. It has been the will of large farmers who would actually
have to suffer the costs of compliance. A USDA study found that only
46% of small farms (defined as less than 300 animal units, or 750
126
hogs weighing more than fifty-five pounds) would comply with the
127
EPA’s 2003 proposed regulations for nitrogen discharges.
However, only 18% of large farms (defined as more than 2500 hogs
128
129
of at least fifty-five pounds)
would meet the same standard.
Similarly skewed numbers existed for the EPA phosphorous standard:
130
The net costs of
69% of small farms versus 20% of large farms.
properly disposing of hog manure—paying crop farmers to accept it
as fertilizer—depends on how much excess manure is generated and
also whether there are nearby crop farmers that can use it without
creating nutrient overloading problems of their own. Large farms will
generally pay significantly higher costs for disposal on a per-unit
basis, if one subtracts out the one-time plan development costs that
131
are required.
Given these cost dynamics, it seems clear that large
farms have had the most to lose from the EPA regulation of water
pollution from hog farming.
C. Failure to Regulate Air Emissions from CAFOs
Pollution from hog manure is not limited to runoff. Much less
appreciated, but still quite costly, are the air emissions from hog
manure. Volatilized ammonia, the gaseous form of nitrogen
emanating from hog excrement, pollutes in two ways: (1) by
deposition onto land or water, reaching land and waterbodies beyond
a spill range, and (2) while airborne, acting as a source of air
pollution.

126

RIBAUDO, ET AL., supra note 59, at 14.
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003).
128 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 14.
129 Id. at 17 tbl.3-1.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 18–25. Plan development costs are high for small farms that do not already
have them (and who would fail to meet the standard). The net disposal costs are actually
higher for small farms than large farms. Id. at 20.
127
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Ammonia emitted from hog manure and deposited onto land or
water will assume the form of ammonia ions, which acidify soils and
132
receiving waterbodies.
An estimated 430,000 tons of ammonia
133
were emitted in 2002, enough to make over thirty-seven billion 32134
Deposit after emission tends to occur
ounce bottles of Windex.
135
In
relatively locally, within thirty miles of the emitting CAFO.
addition to presenting ecological threats through land or water
deposition, ammonia also presents a public health threat. Airborne
ammonia is a fine particulate matter, which causes respiratory
136
problems ranging from irritation and asthma to premature death,
and ammonia is estimated to be about half of all fine particulate
137
matter emitted in the eastern United States.
138
CAFOs also emit hydrogen sulfide, which causes health effects
139
ranging from temporary to long-term moodiness and depression
and, in more serious cases, severe debilitation and even the occasional
140
death.
The most prevalent health effects of emissions are non132 Sagar V. Krupa, Effects of Atmospheric Ammonia (NH3) on Terrestrial Vegetation:
A Review, 124 ENVTL. POLLUTION 179, 205 (2003).
133 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSION INVENTORY–AMMONIA
EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 4 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch09
/related/nh3inventoryfactsheet_jan2004.pdf.
134 MATERIAL SAFETY AND DATA SHEET: WINDEX POWERIZED GLASS CLEANER
(RTU), DIVERSEY (2012), http://www foothill.edu/printmaking/msds/windex_msds.pdf
(indicates that it is 0.1% to 1.5% ammonia by weight); AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com
(search “Windex 32oz”) (shipping weight of a 32-ounce glass is 2.3 pounds) (search
conducted March 3, 2015, printout on file with author).
135 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 54.
136 Donald R. McCubbin et al., Livestock Ammonia Management and ParticulateRelated Health Benefits, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1141, 1141 (2002); Particulate Matter
(PM), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pm/ (last updated Sept. 10, 2015).
Fine particulate matter is defined as airborne solids less than 2.5 microns in diameter. Id.
137 Natalie Anderson et al., Airborne Reduced Nitrogen: Ammonia Emissions from
Agriculture and Other Sources, 29 ENVMT. INT’L 277, 277 (2003).
138 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 55.
139 Kaye H. Kilburn, Exposure to Reduced Sulfur Gases Impairs Neurobehavioral
Function, 90 S. MED. J. 997, 997 (1997); Susan S. Schiffman et al., Symptomatic Effects of
Exposure to Diluted Air Sampled from a Swine Confinement Atmosphere on Healthy
Human Subjects, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 567, 567 (2005).
140 Kelley J. Donham et al., Acute Toxic Exposure to Gases from Liquid Manure, 24 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 142, 144 (1982); Kelley Donham et al., Environmental and Health
Studies of Farm Workers in Swedish Swine Confinement Buildings, 46 BRITISH J. INDUS.
MED. 31, 32 (1989); Kelley J. Donham, Health Effects from Work in Swine Confinement
Buildings, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 17, 18 (1990); Kelley J. Donham et al., Production
Rates of Toxic Gases from Liquid Swine Manure: Health Implications for Workers and
Animals in Swine Confinement Buildings, 24 BIOLOGICAL WASTES 161, 163 (1988); Lida
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lethal, but still costly. A number of studies have shown that CAFO
emissions lead to significant increases in cases of asthma and nasal
141
Effects are more acute among adolescents attending
allergies.
school near large hog CAFOs, who suffer a higher incidence of
142
143
asthma, and more acute still for children living on hog farms.
Like water pollution regulation under the Clean Water Act, air
pollution regulation under the Clean Air Act would be challenging
from an administrative perspective. Unlike the Clean Water Act, the
Clean Air Act contains no explicit inclusion of CAFOs into a
144
so the EPA could more
regulatory definition like “point source,”
defensibly avoid the task. The EPA rule for water pollution from
CAFOs is a general permit, which applies broadly to a class of
dischargers, thereby avoiding the need to issue each of the sixty
145
thousand hog farms individually. No such mechanism exists under
the Clean Air Act. Regulating each CAFO as a “source” of pollution,
much like one would regulate a fossil-fueled power plant or a
refinery, would be an enormous headache for the EPA.
Indisputably, however, emissions pose public health threats. Just as
the EPA can target its water pollution regulatory efforts towards the
largest hog CAFOs, it can target its air emissions regulation in large
part toward the same hog CAFOs. After all, the source of the water
pollution and air pollution is the same: the manure.

N. Osbern & Robert O. Crapo, Dung Lung: A Report of Toxic Exposure to Liquid Manure,
95 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 312, 314 (1981).
141 Frank M. Mitloehner & Marc B. Schenker, Commentary, Environmental Exposure
and Health Effects from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGY
309, 310 (2007); Katja Radon et al., Environmental Exposure to Confined Animal Feeding
Operations and Respiratory Health of Neighboring Residents, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGY 300,
306–07 (2007).
142 Maria C. Mirabelli et al., Asthma Symptoms Among Adolescents Who Attend Public
Schools That Are Located Near Confined Swine Feeding Operations, 118 PEDIATRICS
e66, e70–e73 (2006); Maria C. Mirabelli et al., Race, Poverty, and Potential Exposure of
Middle-School Students to Air Emissions from Confined Swine Feeding Operations, 114
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 591, 594 (2006); Sigurdur T. Sigurdarson & Joel N. Kline, School
Proximity to Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Prevalence of Asthma in
Students, 129 CHEST J. 1486, 1488 (2006).
143 James A. Merchant et al., Asthma and Farm Exposures in a Cohort of Rural Iowa
Children, 113 EVNTL. HEALTH PERSP. 350, 350 (2005).
144 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
145 See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (2007) (discussing the three classes of
EPA permits in the NPDES program).
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D. Lack of Oversight of Administration of Antibiotics to Livestock
For decades, scientists have tracked the emergence of bacteria that
are resistant to antibiotics used to treat them. Between 1940 and 1996,
146
eight major strains were discovered.
That number has doubled
147
Every time a person or animal is administered an
since then.
antibiotic—needed or not—bacteria have an opportunity to develop a
resistance to that antibiotic. Those bacteria are then transmitted. One
method of transmission is through the stomach of livestock
administered antibiotics, which is excreted in manure, and then
propagated to wherever the manure is permitted to go. The same is
148
true of humans. With every propagation there is an opportunity for
bacteria to evolve and adapt, multiplying strains that resist the effects
of antibiotics. The overuse of antibiotics in both humans and livestock
has led to an alarming uptick in new antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that
every year, over two million Americans contract a bacterial infection
that is resistant to one or more common antibiotics that have been
149
previously used to treat the infection. Of those, about twenty-three
150
thousand die.
The most damaging strain of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, or MRSA, which
151
MRSA infections
accounts for eleven thousand deaths per year.
seem to have a special link with the use of antibiotics in livestock, as
new strains of MRSA have emerged that are uniquely endemic to
152
The link to livestock use is particularly
hogs and hog farmers.

146

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS
UNITED STATES, 2013 28 (2013) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov
/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 14.
149 Id. at 11.
150 Id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE EVOLVING THREAT OF ANTIMICROBIAL
RESISTANCE: OPTIONS FOR ACTION 28 (2012) (estimating sixty-three thousand out-patient
deaths in the United States and twenty-five thousand in-patient deaths in Europe per year).
151 CDC REPORT, supra note 146, at 16.
152 T. Khanna et al., Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus Colonization in Pigs
and Pig Farmers, 128 VETERINARY MICROBIOLOGY 298, 299–300 (2008); Inge van Loo
et al., Emergence of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus of Animal Origin in
Humans, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1834, 1834 (2007).
IN THE
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strong, as some of these new strains of MRSA have emerged solely
153
from farm animals.
About 80% by volume of the antibiotics administered in the United
154
States are given to livestock. Some CAFOs use antibiotics solely to
promote animal growth, giving animals an added boost in fighting
155
infection and freeing up bodily resources to add weight.
It is
156
especially harmful when CAFOs mix antibiotics in with feed, as if
it were a vitamin supplement. The problem with this kind of
subtherapeutic administration is that these low-level doses are high
enough to affect bacteria, but not high enough to kill them all off—
giving bacteria the maximum chance to adapt, become antibiotic157
resistant, and multiply.
Exactly how common this practice is and who uses them is hard to
say, as until recently neither farmers nor pharmaceutical companies
158
In the
were required to report on their use or sale of antibiotics.
most authoritative study of hog farmers, USDA researchers reported
159
that only 16% of surveyed hog farms did not use antibiotics at all.
The subtherapeutic use of antibiotics was statistically much more
160
frequent on large farms under a production contract. It is not as if
small hog farms avoid the use of antibiotics altogether. But the nature
of hog farming is such that antibiotic use is much more necessary in
the context of very large-scale farming. Some contract hog farmers
153 Khanna et al., supra note 152, at 300 (finding that hog farmers never tested positive
for a specific strain of MRSA unless the hogs also tested positive).
154 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Opinion, How to Develop New Antibiotics, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2015, at A23; David A. Kessler, Opinion, Antibiotics and the Meat We Eat, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at A27; Aude Teillant & Ramanan Laxminarayan, Economics of
Antibiotic Use in U.S. Swine and Poultry Production, 30 CHOICES, First Quarter 2015, at
4.
155 Nigel Key & William D. McBride, Sub-therapeutic Antibiotics and the Efficiency of
U.S. Hog Farms, 96 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 831, 838 tbl.1 (2014) (showing 3.3% of feederto-finish farms using antibiotics for a single purpose, “growth promotion”).
156 Id. at 840 n.13.
157 G. Douglas Inglis et al., Effects of Subtherapeutic Administration of Antimicrobial
Agents to Beef Cattle on the Prevalence of Antimocrobial Resistance in Campylobacter
Jejuni and Campylobacter Hyointestinalis, 71 APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 3872,
3877 (2005); Marc Lipsitch et al., Antibiotics in Agriculture: When is it Time to Close the
Barn Door?, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5752, 5754 (2002); Katherine M. Shea,
Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents in Animal Agriculture: Implications for
Pediatrics, 114 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 862, 862 (2004).
158 The Food and Drug Administration has only recently moved to require disclosure of
antimicrobial drug sales. Antimicrobial Animal Drug Sales and Distribution Reporting, 80
Fed. Reg. 28,863, 28,863 (May 20, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
159 Key & McBride, supra note 155, at 842 tbl.4.
160 Id.
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receive incentive payments based on feed conversion or low mortality
161
rates. So while livestock farming’s share of the blame for the rise
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria cannot be laid entirely on large hog
CAFOs, the failure to regulate the administration of antibiotics to
livestock fits very neatly into the game plan of large, vertically
integrated livestock conglomerates.
While the epidemiological link between the use of antibiotics in
livestock and the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is not
concrete, the evidence is strongly suggestive: antibiotic-resistant
bacteria are commonly found on-site at CAFOs, found downwind and
162
Some antibiotics
downstream, but not found at all upwind.
administered to livestock are in fact the same ones used to treat
humans for life-threatening infections, and which have now lost their
163
effectiveness. Following a ban in the European Union on the use of
antibiotics for growth promotion, levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
164
decreased.
While the use of antibiotics by CAFOs cannot be
completely blamed for the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
and for human illness and death, there is very good reason to believe
165
that the practice is a very significant contributing cause.
Even if antibiotic use for livestock is only weakly linked to the
emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, the shame is that this use is
so unnecessary. In the 2009 survey of hog farmers by USDA
researchers, almost half of those responding reported that they
161

Id. at 848.
Shawn G. Gibbs et al., Airborne Antibiotic Resistant and Nonresistant Bacteria and
Fungi Recovered from Two Swine Herd Confined Animal Feeding Operations, 1 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HYGIENE 699, 701–03 (2004); Shawn G. Gibbs et al., Isolation
of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria from the Air Plume Downwind of a Swine Confined or
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1032, 1036 (2006).
163 PEW, supra note 6, at 15.
164 Frank Møller Aarestrup et al., Effect of Abolishment of the Use of Antimicrobial
Agents for Growth Promotion on Occurrence of Antimicrobial Resistance in Fecal
Enterococci from Food Animals in Denmark, 45 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS &
CHEMOTHERAPY 2054, 2057–58 (2001); H.-D. Emborg et al., Relations Between the
Occurrence of Resistance to Antimicrobial Growth Promoters Among Enterococcus
faecium Isolated from Broilers and Broiler Meat, 84 INT’L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 273,
283 (2003).
165 Jose Luis Martinez, Environmental Pollution by Antibiotics and by Antibiotic
Resistance Determinants, 157 ENVTL. POLLUTION 2893, 2894 (2009); David L. Smith et
al., Animal Antibiotic Use Has an Early but Important Impact on the Emergence of
Antibiotic Resistance in Human Commensal Bacteria, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6434,
6436–37 (2002); Michael Teuber, Veterinary Use and Antibiotic Resistance, 4 CURRENT
OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 493, 497 (2001).
162
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administered antibiotics at least in part for “growth promotion.”
This practice is a reckless endangerment of human health. But to put
an exclamation point on the multidimensional foolishness of this
practice, its contribution to productivity is paltry: the most recent
167
Hogs are
study estimated a weight gain of about 1.0 to 1.3%.
scarcely 1% fatter for this practice, a vanishingly small advantage
when weighed against the harms caused by antibiotic-resistant
bacteria. Indeed, the effectiveness of antibiotics in boosting hog
growth is highest in the presence of poor nutrition and otherwise poor
conditions for hogs, simply because there is more disease for the
168
Antibiotics, as it turns out, work best as a
antibiotics to treat.
substitute for competent management and humane treatment of
animals.
Certainly the administration of antibiotics to livestock has played a
very significant role in the emergence of resistant strains. If even a
small fraction of those two million Americans sickened and twentythree thousand dead every year from antibiotic-resistant bacterial
infections could be attributed to hog farms, a cost-benefit analysis
would reveal a vast differential between huge costs and miniscule
169
benefits.
Perhaps even more alarming than the emergence of antibioticresistant bacteria is the introduction of risk of interspecies pathogen
170
transfer, for which hogs seem to serve as particularly helpful hosts.
The confinement of a large number of animals to a small area
provides an excellent breeding ground for new viruses. Not only does
the tight confinement of livestock make transmission more likely, but

166

Key & McBride, supra note 155, at 838 tbl.1.
Id. at 839, 848; see also Gay Y. Miller et al., Farm-Level Impacts of Banning
Growth-Promoting Antibiotic Use in U.S. Pig Grower/Finisher Operations, 23 J.
AGRIBUSINESS 147, 159 tbl.6 (2005); Gay Y. Miller et al., Productivity and Economic
Effects of Antibiotics Used for Growth Promotion in U.S. Pork Production, 35 J. AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. 469, 471 (2003).
168 VIRGIL W. HAYS, EFFECTIVENESS OF FEED ADDITIVE USAGE OF ANTIBACTERIAL
AGENTS IN SWINE AND POULTRY PRODUCTION 31–40 (1970).
169 CDC REPORT, supra note 146, at 11. The report estimates that the national cost of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria may be as high as twenty billion dollars in direct health care
costs and an additional thirty-five billion dollars in lost productivity. Id. These numbers do
not include the value of statistical lives lost due to infection by antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
Id.
170 Kendall P. Myers et al., Are Swine Workers in the United States at Increased Risk of
Infection with Zoonotic Influenza Virus?, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 14, 14
(2006); Kendall P. Myers et al., Cases of Swine Influenza in Humans: A Review of the
Literature, 44 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1084, 1084 (2007).
167
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it makes life stressful for animals and increases their vulnerability to
171
Moreover, farmers and farmworkers in CAFOs routinely
disease.
deal with thousands of animals daily, a stark contrast to the much less
172
intense interactions on small farms.
The health threats to workers
posed by CAFOs, combined with the higher likelihood of animal
sickness in CAFOs, produces an especially heightened risk of
173
interspecies transfer. The evolution of zoonotic disease into forms
that infect humans has always been a game of chance, but the intense
concentration of animals in tight quarters and the exposure of workers
to new viruses is the equivalent of millions of additional rolls of the
dice.
This wanton overuse and misuse of antibiotics, and the crowded,
industrialized farming it engenders, is a conscious policy choice.
Banning the use of antibiotics in livestock, as hog-export power
174
would not only eliminate whatever
Denmark has done,
responsibility hog farming bears for antibiotic-resistant bacteria, but
also potentially discourage the overcrowded conditions that incubate
dangerous zoonotic diseases that could transfer to humans. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has legal authority to regulate “new
175
animal drugs” if they are “unsafe.” The FDA considered doing so,
going so far in 1973 as to require antibiotic manufacturers to provide
any test results and “[b]y April 20, 1975, data satisfying all other
specified criteria for safety and effectiveness,” and threatening the
176
firms with withdrawal of approval of the drugs. This initiative went
nowhere. It was not until 2012—thirty-seven years later—that the
EPA announced a plan to work with drug makers to phase out the
177
most dangerous practices, a plan that was promptly struck down by

171

PEW, supra note 6, at 13.
Id.
173 Gregory C. Gray et al., Pandemic Influenza Planning: Shouldn’t Swine and Poultry
Workers Be Included?, 25 VACCINE 4376, 4377–78 (2007); Roberto A. Saenz et al.,
Confined Animal Feeding Operations as Amplifiers of Influenza, 6 VECTOR-BORNE &
ZOONOTIC DISEASES 338, 344 (2006).
174 Teillant & Laxminarayan, supra note 154, at 4.
175 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (2012).
176 New Animal Drugs, 38 Fed. Reg. 9811, 9813 (proposed Apr. 20, 1973) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 135).
177 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY REPORT NO. 209, THE JUDICIOUS USE OF MEDICALLY IMPORTANT
ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS 17–19 (2012).
172
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178

a federal court as being insufficient. On appeal the Second Circuit
reversed the district court, finding that the FDA’s regulation is a
179
As a result, the use of
reasonable interpretation of the statute.
antibiotics for livestock not only continues, but shows an alarming
180
increase.
An additional question should be asked: Even if the FDA somehow
overcomes its long history of delaying regulation on the
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in livestock, is it worth allowing
livestock in CAFOs to receive antibiotics at all? In the 2011 survey,
hog farmers could have reported that, in addition to or instead of
“growth promotion,” they used antibiotics for “disease treatment”
181
and/or “disease prevention.” It is easy to imagine that when asked,
hog farmers might minimize their guilt feelings by shading their
responses away from the naked “growth promotion” answer. But even
if these responses were to be taken at face value, so what? Separating
out these responses creates distinctions without differences. Even
“disease treatment” is a use of antibiotics that would not be necessary
if hogs were not raised in the crowded, confined conditions of
CAFOs. CAFOS create stressful conditions and cause more illness
because infectious disease is transmitted more easily than on
182
traditional, small-scale farms. In a sense, almost all administration
of antibiotics to hogs in CAFOs is productivity enhancement. The
point of administering antibiotics to hogs in large CAFOs is to take a
traditional mortality that was low and squash that rate down to zero,
even as the conditions for sickness intensify. That is a trivial benefit
compared to the potential risks to the human population—particularly
when the alternative is the raising of hogs on less-intense, small-scale
farms. Again, in leaving hog farming alone, we have left hog farming
to the large conglomerates.

178 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 872 F. Supp. 2d 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151, 166 (2d Cir. 2014).
179 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 760 F.3d at 166.
180 David Hoffman & Emma Schwartz, Sharp Increase Seen in Sales of Antibiotics for
Use in Farm Animals, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages
/frontline/health-science-technology/trouble-with-antibiotics/sharp-increase-seen-in-sales
-of-antibiotics-for-use-in-farm-animals/.
181 Key & McBride, supra note 155, at 838 tbl.1.
182 PEW, supra note 6, at 13.
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E. Failure to Prevent Market Concentration Through Trade
Regulation
It should not be a surprise that a problem of industrial
concentration in hog farming would have a substantial antitrust
component. In many ways, hog farming is no different from other
industries that have consolidated in recent years, such as commercial
airlines, accounting firms, law firms, or broadband providers.
However, trade practices in livestock are governed by the 1921
183
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), not the Sherman Antitrust Act
184
(Sherman Act).
The PSA replaces, not supplements, the Sherman
185
Act by excluding meatpacking from the terms of the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act jurisprudence took a sharp laissez-faire turn with
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., in which the United States Supreme Court
declared that the Act was intended to be a “consumer welfare
186
prescription.” Citing Robert Bork’s influential book, The Antitrust
Paradox, the Court brushed aside nearly seven decades of
jurisprudence and antitrust policy that was oriented towards
187
preserving competition, rather than maximizing consumer welfare.
Under this new view, as long as consumer welfare is not reduced,
188
almost any business practice survives Sherman Act scrutiny.
Bork’s noninterventionist view of the Sherman Act, strongly taken up
189
by scholars at the University of Chicago,
has been vigorously
190
but everyone agrees that, as a
contested on normative grounds,
183 Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, tit. I, § 1, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).
184 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
185 H.R. REP. NO. 85-1048, at 14 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5213, 5222
(“To justify its removal of the meatpacking industry from these [antitrust] statutes and
from the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, the Packers and Stockyards Act
provided additionally a substitute regulation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Department of Agriculture.”).
186 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)).
187 Id.
188 Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2013) (“The
operational goal . . . is to let business be free of antitrust unless its acts will decrease
aggregate consumer surplus . . . .”).
189 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle,
and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2163 (2013); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 73 n.32 (1982).
190 Fox, supra note 188, at 2159; Michael S. Jacobs, Essay, An Essay on the Normative
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 236–42 (1995).
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191

descriptive matter, they have mostly won.
Analysis under the
Sherman Act is welfarist in nature, intervention has been infrequent,
and consumer welfare has served a dominant criterion for evaluating
192
The question has been whether or
the legality of trade practices.
not the PSA should be administered with the same lenience. If
consumer surplus were the touchstone, then the consolidation of the
hog industry, having produced more pork at lower prices, would
likely be viewed as benign.
In form, there appears to be less emphasis on consumer surplus
under PSA than is the case under the Sherman Act. Case law arising
under Section 202 of the PSA prohibits any “unfair, unjustly
193
“any undue or
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device”;
unreasonable preference[,] . . . advantage[,] . . . prejudice or
194
disadvantage”;
and “any course of business[,] . . . any act for the
purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controlling prices, . . . of
195
creating a monopoly . . . or of restraining commerce.” The question
that has arisen under this section is whether a violation of Section 202
196
has occurred if there has been no injury to competition.
Most
courts have held that an injury to competition must be found in order
197
for an action under Section 202 to be maintained, which makes it
harder to bring an enforcement action against some anticompetitive
practice. But at least the inquiry focuses on the competition itself,
rather than consumer surplus.
In practice, the PSA has not served as much of a restraint on
anticompetitive activity in the livestock industry. The Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), and its
predecessor, the Packers and Stockyards Administration—agencies
charged with administering the PSA and policing anticompetitive
198
practices in the livestock industry —have been uninterested in
191 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2182 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2471, 2496 (2013).
192 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 124–30 (4th ed. 2014); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 71–73 (1994).
193 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) (2012).
194 Id. at § 192(b).
195 Id. at § 192(e).
196 John D. Shively & Jeffrey S. Roberts, Competition Under the Packers and
Stockyards Act: What Now?, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 419, 430–36 (2010).
197 Id. at 433–34.
198 Id. at 420.
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challenging the consolidation of the livestock industry. The PSA was
passed at a time in which five meatpacking companies had established
199
200
an oligopsony and oligopoly (selling cuts of meat to distributors
201
and supermarkets) that had the effect of raising meat prices.
In
1991, the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the
meatpacking industry had become even more concentrated than the
oligopsonist and oligopolist conditions in 1921 that gave impetus to
the PSA: a mere four firms controlled 70% of the entire meatpacking
202
industry. The GAO had stern words for the Packers and Stockyards
203
Administration.
The GAO strongly recommended that in light of
the rapidly changing livestock industry, the agency quickly develop
programs for monitoring and analyzing livestock industry practices,
such as price manipulation and the apportioning of territory among
204
meatpackers. The Packers and Stockyards Administration was not
205
even collecting data on prices.
Six years later, the GAO, in following up on its 1991 report, noted
206
that concentration had increased to 81% in 1995.
It reiterated its
1991 recommendations, noting that the newly-formed agency GIPSA
“has begun reallocating its resources to place more emphasis on
207
but that progress was
detecting anticompetitive violations,”

199 Oligopsony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“Control or domination of
a market by a few large buyers or customers.”). The “Big Five” represented an oligopsony
through buying finished livestock for slaughter. See Shively & Roberts, supra note 196, at
422–23.
200 Oligopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 199 (“Control or domination of
a market by a few large sellers, creating high prices and low output similar to those found
in a monopoly.”). The “Big Five” represented an oligopoly through selling cuts of meat to
distributors and supermarkets. See Shively & Roberts, supra note 196, at 422–23.
201 Shively & Roberts, supra note 196, at 423.
202 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-92-36, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
ADMINISTRATION: OVERSIGHT OF LIVESTOCK MARKET COMPETITIVENESS NEEDS TO BE
ENHANCED 3 (1991), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151157.pdf.
203 Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-354, §§
201–96, 108 Stat. 3178, 3209–3238 (1994) (forming The Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) by merging the Federal Grain Inspection Service and
the Packers and Stockyards Administration).
204 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 202, at 4.
205 Id.
206 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-100, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
PROGRAMS: USDA’S RESPONSE TO STUDIES ON CONCENTRATION IN THE LIVESTOCK
INDUSTRY 2 (1997), [hereinafter USDA’S RESPONSE], http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997
/rc97100.pdf.
207 Id. at 3.
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208

disappointingly slow.
Another ten years later, an audit by the
USDA Inspector General not only found shockingly little progress by
209
but
GIPSA in setting up monitoring and data collection systems,
found a treasure trove of new instances of incompetence and
indifference to anticompetitive behavior. Out of the listed 1,842
investigations on file, GIPSA could not even identify the location of
the investigation in 1,799 of those files (apparently, it could with the
210
remaining forty-three).
The Inspector General found that the
relationship between management and staff was strained,
“significantly contribut[ing] to the agency not being able to ensure
211
open and competitive markets for livestock, meat, and poultry.”
Shockingly and tellingly, staff economists, who should be at the
forefront of an agency charged with analyzing markets, were
marginalized and frozen out of investigations into anticompetitive
212
This was true despite the 1997
practices and effects on trade.
recommendation that had specifically suggested that economists be
213
brought into the investigative processes and policy.
While the 1994 reorganization that created GIPSA was disruptive,
it is hard to explain away the subsequent two-decade-long chaos that
has reigned over the agency since. Certainly a trade regulation agency
that has marginalized its economists would appear to be one that is
uninterested in carrying out its economic mandate. Under the watch
of GIPSA and its predecessor agency, the market share of the top four
214
pork packers increased from 40% in 1990 to 66% in 2007.
Beef
packing is even more concentrated, with the top four producers
215
Three of the top four hog
owning 83.5% of the market in 2007.
packers are also the top three beef packers—Tyson Foods, Swift &
Co., and Cargill—while the top pork packer is the behemoth

208

Id. at 4–6.
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, NE. REGION, REPORT
NO. 30601-01-HY, AUDIT REPORT: GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
ADMINISTRATION’S MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
PROGRAMS 5 (2006), http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/30601-01-HY.pdf.
210 Id. at 6–7.
211 Id. at 5.
212 Id. at 2–3.
213 USDA’S RESPONSE, supra note 206, at 8.
214 MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM HEFFERNAN, UNIV. OF MO., CONCENTRATION
OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS (2007), http://www foodcircles missouri.edu/07contable
.pdf.
215 Id.
209
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Smithfield Foods, which slaughters over twenty-seven million hogs
216
per year, good for 26% of the total market.
The legislative history of the PSA suggests that Congress was
217
concerned with protecting competition, not consumer surplus.
In
going beyond the Sherman Act, the PSA can be read as encompassing
a broader set of values than just the consumer surplus standards which
218
It is true that the
dominates the Sherman Act jurisprudence.
Sherman Act has become a welfarist statute despite a legislative
history that is lacking any hint of a Congressional welfarist
219
But in passing the PSA, Congress had an important
concern.
220
constituency in mind: farmers. Unlike Sherman Act problems, the
livestock industry has a long-standing and identifiable group with a
vested and articulable interest in competitive markets for their own
sake. While “consumers” may be too large and nebulous a group to
have a proxy, small farms are not. The existence of small farms
throughout the course of passage and amendments of the PSA shows
that Congress recognized the interests of this constituency and passed
the PSA with that group in mind.

216

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1048, at 1 (1957) (“The primary purpose of this Act is to assure
fair competition and fair trade practices in livestock marketing and in the meatpacking
industry.”).
218 Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 591 F.3d 355, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2009) (Garza, J.,
dissenting); Swift & Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1962); Christopher
M. Bass, More than a Mirror: The Packers and Stockyards Act, Antitrust Laws, and the
Injury to Competition Requirement, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423, 431–32 (2007).
219 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192
(2008) (“The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community today is that the antitrust
laws were passed to promote economic efficiency. This view, held by most economists,
conservative scholars, federal enforcers, and practicing lawyers, is incorrect. Neither the
sole nor even the primary purpose of these laws is, or ever has been, to enhance efficiency.
Instead, . . . the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.”). Most sponsors
of the Sherman Act were more concerned with the effective wealth transfer from
consumers to monopolist producers. Senator George Frisbie Hoar, one of the key
shepherds of the Act, complained of “transaction[s] the only purpose of which is to extort
from the community . . . wealth which ought . . . to be generally diffused over the whole
community.” Id. at 202 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2461, 2728 (1890)).
220 H.R. REP. NO. 85-1048, at 16 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5213, 5223
(“It is this area which most concerns small packer competitors and various other small
business men who are links in the meat business . . . . It is this area which most requires
effective regulation.”).
217
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III
WHY SAVING SMALL FARMS MATTERS
The intensification and concentration of agriculture has clearly
produced gains for both producers and consumers. A farmer in 1940
did well to harvest seventy to eighty bushels of corn per acre, but corn
221
farmers today routinely harvest two hundred bushels per acre.
Livestock farming has seen even more impressive gains. In 1950,
chickens took an average of eighty-four days to grow to five pounds;
222
This has
by 2005, that period had shortened to forty-five days.
translated into savings for consumers: in 1970, the average American
spent over 4% of her income on 194 pounds of meat; by 2005, she
223
But in addition to
spent about 2% of her income on 221 pounds.
increasing air and water pollution and contributing to public health
risks, an intensified and concentrated agricultural sector imposes
other costs on society that would be avoided by a more diffuse sector
that decentralizes production on a larger number of smaller farms.
On one level, saving small farms is just a proxy for reducing the
enormous environmental and social costs of large-scale farming.
Whether or not small farms could be saved from the rigors of
competition, it is worth forcing large farms to internalize the
environmental and social costs they impose on society. However
impressive are the gains in productivity and profit, they are still
eclipsed by the heartbreakingly large number of human deaths,
illnesses, and catastrophic health risks, and a large variety of other
costs of large-scale farming. The regulatory gaps that allow CAFOs to
thrive in such great numbers are egregiously inefficient, in that
consumers, if they could choose, would be willing to pay more for
meat in exchange for relief from the multitude of problems generated
by industrialized agriculture. Moreover, along with exacerbating
environmental and social ills, we are destroying a much more benign
model of food production and losing the human and social capital that
is required to maintain it. There are significant irreversibilities in
going down this path.
Conglomerates have essentially become more efficient by
substituting capital for labor, employing fewer people at the local
level, and substituting some different management techniques that
save on labor costs. What little labor industrialized agriculture adds is
221
222
223

PEW, supra note 6, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
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apt to reside in some central headquarters where complex decisions
are made regarding inventory, flow, feedstock, and other factors that
are efficiently woven together. But this concentration of productive
inputs away from the individual and toward the centralized
conglomerate reduces the demand for labor at the local level and the
224
human capital traditionally required to farm. There may be a great
many other factors, but as large employers in agricultural
communities, farms clearly exert an influence on employment
225
patterns. There is no doubt that one of the efficiencies realized by
large conglomerates is the ability to pay fewer people at the local
level. To a great extent, this is the normal evolution of an industry as
it reduces costs. There is no denying that more people have more
access to meat now than was the case just a few decades ago.
However, a hidden cost in the process is the loss of social and human
226
capital in those rural agricultural communities.
The human capital of farming on a small scale may seem
anachronistic, but it remains a vital part of a functioning economy.
The groundbreaking human capital scholar Theodore Schultz noted
that farmers made extremely efficient utilization of the technologies
227
In Schultz’s 1979 Nobel Prize lecture, The
available to them.
Economics of Being Poor, he denounced what he perceived as the
widespread condescension toward farmers: “People who are rich find
it hard to understand the behaviour of poor people. Economists are no
exception, for they too find it difficult to comprehend the preferences

224 See generally STAFF OF S. SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AM. SMALL
BUS., 79TH CONG., REP. ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE
CENTRAL VALLEY OF CALIFORNIA ON EFFECTS OF SCALE OF FARM OPERATIONS (Comm.
Print 1946) (discussing a time-tested and still-debated study of rural welfare and farm
size); Linda M. Lobao et al., Still Going: Recent Debates on the Goldschmidt Hypothesis,
58 RURAL SOC. 277 (1993) (comparing recent studies with the Goldschmidt report). But
see Donna Barnes & Audie Blevins, Farm Structure and the Economic Well-Being of
Nonmetropolitan Counties, 57 RURAL SOC. 333, 344–45 (1992) (focusing on the
relationship between farm structure and county agricultural dependency).
225 See generally Linda M. Lobao & Michael D. Schulman, Farming Patterns, Rural
Restructuring, and Poverty: A Comparative Regional Analysis, 56 RURAL SOC. 565
(1991) (examining the implications of rural economic organization on poverty).
226 PEW, supra note 6, at 43.
227 THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE 3 (1964);
Will Martin & Devashish Mitra, Productivity Growth and Convergence in Agriculture
Versus Manufacturing, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 403, 404 (2001).
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and scarcity constraints that determine the choices that poor people
228
make.”
Being a farmer not only requires hard physical labor, but also
requires underappreciated ingenuity in the face of binding economic
229
For
constraints and a great deal of inherent commodity risk.
230
decades, fewer people have chosen this line of work.
To be sure,
the migration of jobs and people from agricultural communities has a
multitude of macroeconomic causes well beyond the scope of this
231
Article that have nothing to do with concentration in agriculture.
But the rise of industrialized agriculture is predicated on the
replacement of the human capital of traditional farming, which is a
232
substantial source of the cost savings. CAFOs with market power
drive down the wages that need to be paid to contract growers, who
233
no longer make the farm management decisions. But this model of
agricultural production ignores a wide variety of broader societal
considerations, reviewed in this Article and externalized by large
agricultural conglomerates.
Additionally, agriculture’s march toward concentration will destroy
the social capital resident in traditionally agricultural communities.
Social capital is the network of interpersonal and intra-organizational
bonds that are formed through cooperation or expected cooperation.
Robert Putnam’s pioneering Bowling Alone, argues that social capital
enhances political and civic life without consciously having these
234
But possibly even more important, social
outcomes as objectives.

228 Theodore W. Schultz & Sir Arthur Lewis, Prize Lecture, The Economics of Being
Poor, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 1979) (transcript available at NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1979/schultz-lecture
html).
229 David G. Abler & Vasant A. Sukhatme, The “Efficient but Poor” Hypothesis, 28
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 338, 339 (2006).
230 DIMITRI ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; John E. Bregger, Measuring Self-Employment in
the United States, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (1996).
231 See generally Wallace E. Huffman, Farm and Off-Farm Work Decisions: The Role
of Human Capital, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 14 (1980) (discussing the implications of
education levels on off-farm labor supplies of farmers); Robert Tamura, Human Capital
and the Switch from Agriculture to Industry, 27 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 207
(2002) (explaining technology’s role in the transition of human labor from agriculture to
industry).
232 Another source of savings is the mechanization, the replacement of farm animals
with machines such as tractors. DIMITRI ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
233 PEW, supra note 6, at 42.
234 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 336–49 (2000).
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235

capital can play a vital role in increasing productivity
in poor,
236
resource-based communities such as fishing communities. In poor,
resource-based communities that lack either physical or human
capital, social capital provides valuable informational benefits,
lubricates mercantile relations, and dispenses with the need for
237
To the extent that large
expensive and perhaps futile monitoring.
238
agricultural conglomerates are drying up agricultural communities,
they are wasting this reserve of social capital.
Finally, there is one more vital role for small farms that must be
preserved: the presentation of choice to consumers. With almost 90%
of chickens produced under contract and 90% of hogs slaughtered by
239
it has become increasingly difficult for meat
large plants,
consumers to obtain meat that is anything but low-quality, low-cost,
and produced under poor conditions. Markets for premium meat
240
It is
products exist, but are consigned to niche market status.
important to learn lessons from concentration in other industries that
have consolidated and generated tremendous consumer displeasure.
Complaints about commercial air travel in an industry dominated by
241
as the industry marches
three legacy carriers has only increased

235 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A
MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 3–5 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000);
Robert M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in SOCIAL
CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 6–9, supra.
236 PUTNAM, supra note 234, at 359 (“Historically social capital has been the main
weapon of the have-nots, who lacked other forms of capital.”); James M. Acheson, The
Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 385–86
(1985); Sean R. Lauer, Entrepreneurial Processes in an Emergent Resource Industry:
Community Embeddedness in Maine’s Sea Urchin Industry, 70 RURAL SOC. 145, 146
(2005); James A. Wilson, Adaptation to Uncertainty and Small Numbers Exchange: The
New England Fresh Fish Market, 11 BELL J. ECON. 491, 503–04 (1980).
237 James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC.
S95, S99 (1988).
238 Rural areas have always tended to be poorer than urban areas, but studies suggest
that agricultural communities with CAFOs are poorer than those without. See E. Paul
Durrenberger & Kendall M. Thu, The Expansion of Large Scale Hog Farming in Iowa:
The Applicability of Goldschmidt’s Findings Fifty Years Later, 55 HUMAN ORG. 409, 413
tbl.4 (1996) (showing higher rates of food stamp participation in CAFO communities than
agricultural communities without).
239 PEW, supra note 6, at 21–22.
240 M.S. Honeyman et al., The United States Pork Niche Market Phenomenon, 84 J.
ANIM. SCI. 2269, 2269 (2006).
241 Ismat Sarah Mangla, Complaints About Airlines Reach 13-Year High, Says DOT,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/complaints-about-airlines
-reach-13-year-high-says-dot-1812966.
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towards a duopoly. If livestock conglomerates are following the
example of the commercial airlines, they are clearly misguided, to say
the least. But the greatest costs will take the form of lost consumer
surplus resulting from the loss of choice.
Saving small farms matters because agricultural production by
large agricultural conglomerates carries many different price tags,
each too high for the value it adds. Saving small farms also matters
because it is important to maintain an agricultural industry that is
robust, diverse, and healthy. Small is not necessarily beautiful, or
healthier, or environmentally better, but small, traditional farms are
much less likely to impose the scale externalities imposed by large
farms.
CONCLUSION
It would appear that wealth and power in the agricultural sector has
become increasingly concentrated, much the way that wealth has
concentrated generally in most developed economies. The external
costs imposed by large agricultural conglomerates, and hog CAFOs in
particular, are shocking and should be a policy reform priority. Hog
CAFOs are a bane of any community: they cause property
devaluation of land within several miles, they pollute water in
unacceptable quantities, and they pollute air enough to pose a
significant threat to public health. It is disgraceful that regulators have
allowed CAFOs to impose these health risks upon the broader public
and allowed them to incubate the development of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria and zoonotic viruses.
This Article emphasizes not just the externalities of CAFOs, but
the broader question of what kind of industry structure best serves
both consumers and the general public. Industry concentration
commonly increases consumer surplus. But this is a very narrow
benefit. A variety of other social and environmental considerations
belong in the calculus of any production decision—in any industry.
The problem with industry concentration, and particularly the
concentration of hog CAFOs, is that the parsimony of cost
minimization has driven out all other considerations, many of them
vastly more important than just consumer price.
What kind of an agricultural industry can better internalize its
social and environmental costs? It would be a trap to romanticize the
bucolic farm life. Agricultural communities have always been poor,
and college-educated individuals have always been less common on
farms than in other places in American industry. But this is a social
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construct: low commodity prices means low pay, which means that
young workers have a higher payout if they leave the farm to pursue
higher education. What this social construct elides is the need to
produce food without also producing a panoply of other problems.
That is a more demanding task, one which requires a more developed
human capital, building on an existing base of farming knowledge
that already embodies far more wisdom in environmental stewardship
than agricultural conglomerates possess. And yet, more is required to
place agriculture in a larger social context of a more complex menu of
needs other than just food provision. Reform of public policy to avoid
excusing environmental, health, and economic harms arising from
agricultural practices would represent a much-needed start to the long
but necessary process of reassembling an agricultural industry that
has lost its way.
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